

17 November 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [] Proposal

1. [] hears concern about lack of controls within APEX. All material could become available to a person who has the APEX. He is looking for ways to prevent this. Presently he sees two safeguards:

1. A finding of "must know" for each of the needed categories, COMINT, ELINT, IMAGRY, TECH by the SIO (and - as yet not enunciated).
 - a. with central registration and requirements for certification of access approval before receipt of material.
 - b. some sort of statement on the badge.

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2. [] has provided a legal interpretation of E.O. 12065 under which:

- a. Only the DCI can establish compartments for intelligence sources and methods.
- b. All compartments must be reviewed and approved by the DCI every 5 years or they automatically terminate (except that international compartments won't automatically terminate - they do have to be reviewed).

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c. Any level of classified material, Confidential, Secret, Top Secret can be compartmented.

d. Material that is placed in compartmentation is subject to all the requirements of the E.O. for classified material. Advantage is being taken of the provision of E.O. 12065 that some categories of classified material need not be classified paragraph by paragraph or section by section if a waiver of this requirement is obtained from the Information Security Oversight Office. [] informed that some requests for waiver are being prepared by CIA at the present time. He did not specify for what. He was not opposed to the idea of seeking a waiver for the COMINT and IMAGERY and ELINT and Technical categories of intelligence in [] TOP SECRET APEX compartmentation scheme).

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3. [] proposes resolution of the question about how analysts (by which he means photo interpreters and cryptographers as well as NFAC people who are working from COMINT reports and IMAGERY film and reports) can get hold of enough information about the collection platform to do their job through a mechanism of:

a. Tasking the Program managers operating the collection system to prepare extracts (blue books) of operational data to satisfy needs of "analysts" [The issue is unresolved whether or not Blue Books would receive codewords and be treated as separate subcompartments of operational programs [] or whether the material would be treated as part of the data included in the respective generic categories of COMINT, ELINT, IMAGERY and TECHNICAL [] Operational Manual. ;

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b. Having SIO's nominate specific individuals within each of the populations already approved for access to COMINT, ELINT, etc. and submitting these lists to the collector for negotiation over approval.

c. A central registration of these people.

In example of how this would work in CIA. The DDS&T would establish to his satisfaction a list of people in his directorate who would meet the criteria for must know for COMINT. He would identify a small proportion of these as requiring access to Blue Book COMINT. Both lists would be submitted, with justification, to the DCI. The DCI (or DDCI as the SIO for the Central Intelligence Agency) would review the justification and names of people nominated for access to the COMINT category. If satisfactory, the list would be approved and individuals would be centrally recorded. The DDCI would review the list of people nominated for Blue Book access. If satisfactory, it would be submitted to NSA for consideration with the endorsement of the DDCI. The DIRNSA would review and, if he thought the list was too long or if he didn't like some of the justifications or people on the list, he could register objections with the DDCI. Negotiations would follow until a mutual agreement was arrived at. The individuals on the final list would then be centrally registered. A similar process would be followed in the ELINT area and IMAGERY area and Technical area with project managers of these activities reviewing nominations for access to their respective Blue Book.

Once approved, individuals would have an appropriate symbol(s) (C, E, I, T) placed on their badge. Of these people, those who had been approved for access to the Blue Book material would have a post script added to the badge symbol, e.g., CI or EI or II or TI.

The idea of badge indicators was first discussed on 16 November as a possible device to assist in separating people with the different access approvals. It is an extension of the present idea of using an H on badges to indicate that an individual is approved for access to SI and TK material. By using more letter indicators on badges, it would be possible to determine visually the access approval(s) granted an individual and to more clearly define categories of access approvals. There was mention of the possibility of extending the practice of badge markings throughout the Intelligence Community.

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4. [] plans on meeting with the DCI on 17 November to seek clarification of the purpose of the revision of our compartmentation programs. He will ask whether the goal is primarily to facilitate the flow of intelligence or whether the primary thrust is to improve security controls. If the latter, will the DCI be willing to accept the consequence of having a considerable amount of previously compartmented material becoming potentially available to individuals with a TS clearance based on 10 years service and a name check or Secret clearance based on a name check? Would the DCI be willing to advocate that access to APEX [] require a personnel security criteria of DCID 1/14 (DCID 1/14 is not now required for bigot list access).

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